The introductory article to this volume positions the Afghan case within the broader literature on the political economy of war to peace transitions. The paper begins by critiquing the rise of democracy promotion, and then employs a political economy framework to understand the more focused research on democratisation and elections. The paper highlights some of the major features of the Afghan case that provided a backdrop for the 2014 election: a deeply divided society, a highly militarised and invasive international presence, and a history of flawed elections. This discussion helps contextualize the seemingly technical questions about constitutional design, electoral systems, the organisation of elections, and so forth. The concluding section sets out the main themes of the individual contributions that follow.
Introduction
Elections are viewed as an important rite of passage in post conflict societies. It is believed that they both symbolise and help facilitate the transition from violence to politics. Elections signal a new departure, a break with the violent past. They provide a mechanism for managing what had previously been deadly competition, and for legitimising the new political order. A stable long-term peace is thought to depend upon the democratisation of politics, and elections are believed to be an important part of this process, by enabling citizens to chose their leaders and have a stake in the new political dispensation. Peace can thus be 'designed' through the judicious introduction of institutions and processes that create the right incentives for free and fair competition.
Perspectives on elections and the political economy of war to peace transitions
Political theorist Charles Tilly in 'Contention and Democracy in Europe 1650-2000' 2 draws on the metaphors of oil fields, gardens and lakes to explore democracy's characteristics and causal mechanisms. He argues that democracy is unlike an oil field, which can form under only certain conditions over centuries or millennia. Nor is it like a garden, which skilled horticulturalists can bring to life in almost any environment. He concludes that democracy more closely resembles a lake, as lakes are formed in a limited number of contrasting ways, but once in existence share many qualities. The implication of this analogy is that the promoters of democracy should pay careful attention to accumulated historical experience. Democracy cannot be made to just 'grow' anywhere and there is a need to fit interventions to the institutional and cultural context with great care. He warns against the zealous promotion of democracy that ignores history and context; 'flooding rivers do not usually make very stable lakes '. 3 If we work with these metaphors in the case of Afghanistan, then firstly, the oil field analogy can be quickly discounted; the idea that the country will never be 'ready for' democracy or lacks the unique cultural or political features necessary for democracy to take hold is simply not born out by historical or contemporary experience. Secondly, there is ample evidence of Afghanistan being treated as a 'garden' by democratic horticulturalists, who have paid insufficient attention to history and the underlying preconditions for democratisation-with frequently unintended and negative consequences, as shown below. Thirdly, treating democracy as a lake, drawing upon insights from political economy, has been a much rarer line of inquiry in relation to
Afghanistan, yet we believe that it provides a better lens for understanding the dynamics surrounding the 2014 elections and democracy promotion more broadly since 2001. In the first part of this introduction we briefly set out some of the broader This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Conflict, Security & Development Vol. 16 (6) , 481-500 published by Taylor & Francis available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10. 1080/14678802.2016.1246142 Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23405/ 5 promotion is underpinned by a utilitarian understanding of legitimacy i.e. legitimacy is bound up with the ability of the state to deliver key public goods including security, justice and basic services.
Critiques of post war democracy promotion
Whilst few dispute the inherent desirability of democracy as an end point, getting there is typically conflictual. 7 Furthermore there has been a growing critique of externally promoted democratisation, 8 and a related decline in western commitment to democracy aid, linked in part to the damaged status of western democracy, a growing push back from those on the receiving end and rising competition from non-democracies. 9 Elections as an instrument in post-war democratisation have been criticised as a fundamentally flawed strategy. As a highly competitive institution, elections are likely to reinforce rather than heal wartime divisions unless solid political institutions such as political parties and rules of the game are established. 10 Recent research likewise concludes on a cautious note: elections at most set the stage for 'democratic learning' and thus have a democratising potential in the long run. 11 If political transitions are primarily about the restoration (or creation) of legitimate political authority, this suggests a need to focus attention on the 'vernacular' of local politics and how notions of legitimacy are coded and gain meaning in particular contexts. 12 This perspective is reinforced by political economy writing, which shows that, historically, processes of legitimation were the product, not of abstract and universal principles, but extended and violent struggles between rulers and populations. Whilst legitimacy may be cloaked in formal, legal-rational principles, it remains inseparable from underlying power relations and material interests, underpinned by access to the means of violence.
7 Hegre et al., "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992 Yet democracy promotion is closely tied to a set of ideal type Weberian assumptions, which rarely hold in divided societies (or most late developing countries). These assumptions include; the state is a unitary actor which commands a monopoly over the means of violence; the existence of a clear separation between state and society; legitimacy that is based on rational legal mechanisms, including the rule of law, representation through free and fair elections and the provision of public goods including security and public welfare and services.
It is assumed that if these qualities do not exist in divided, post-war states and societies, then with externally promoted 'capacity building' they can be created. Ultimately these Since violence would disrupt these rent sharing agreements, elites have an incentive to maintain political order. From this perspective, elites respond in perfectly rational ways to their environment. This is very different from the idea that poor governance can be attributed to greedy self-interested individuals, and can be addressed by weeding out the 'bad apples'.
A related concept is de Waal's notion of the 'political marketplace', 14 which also highlights the relationship between violence, order and material interests in divided societies. In this framework, politics is seen as analogous to a market place, in which This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Conflict, Security & Development Vol. 16 (6) How specifically do these insights help us understand the political economy of elections and the mobilisation of legitimacy in divided, post-war societies? First, in contexts of exogenous statebuilding, external military and financial support underpin and effectively perform the core functions of statehood, including managing violence, providing services and running elections. In practice, sovereignty is a fiction, since the state cannot exist without external life support. Extreme extroversion shapes elite politics and has major ramifications for how legitimacy is mobilised and maintained.
Since the main sources of finance are external, rather than domestically generated taxation, control of the key interfaces between the international and domestic arenas is the key to political leadership. As a consequence state leaders frequently suffer from a dual legitimacy problem. They cannot survive and dispense largess without satisfying the demands of their international patrons. At the same time they must generate a domestic support base and politico-military backers if they are to ward off challengers to their rule. Too much dependence on the former may undermine their perceived legitimacy with the latter, whilst being too embedded in local patronage structures may undermine their legitimacy with the former. Potentially this legitimacy deficit can be compensated through utilitarian legitimacy, or the capacity of the state to deliver valued resources to its citizens. One problem with this, is that the elites of rentier states have stronger incentives to respond upwards to their international patrons than downwards This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Conflict, Security & Development Vol. 16 (6) Second, legitimacy in LAOs may be defined less in terms of formal elections and modes of representation, than the ability to provide protection and security by managing violence. In Afghanistan, the mobilisation of political support is closely linked to military legitimacy-a form of charismatic authority based upon a track record of 'successful' violent entrepreneurship. 15 Military legitimacy is also closely connected to the ability to mobilise and provide economic resources and in some cases welfare provision as well.
Non-state forms of authority frequently emerge in wartime and perform state-like roles, including collecting taxes and providing public goods such as legal arbitration, business promotion and social welfare. 16 Third, in divided societies, by definition there are competing sources of legitimacy, which may have little to do with formal state authority. In fact there is a long tradition in Afghan society of seeing the state as the outsider and illegitimate. The legitimacy of local notables has been linked to their ability to keep the state at bay-to create a metaphorical 'mud wall' to keep the enumerators and tax collectors out, or at least to negotiate the terms of extraction (Dupree, 2002) . 17 Tribal, ethnic and religious forms of authority were always significant, hence the persistent efforts of the Afghan state to coopt these legitimating institutions. This is not to argue that legitimacy rests upon, and is embedded within, authentic and unchanging Afghan traditions. There has been a sedimentation of new institutions on top of old ones, and Afghan social and political structures have been profoundly changed by the conflict, including a growing demand for more state not less. 18 Yet the fact that the Taliban invested in courts and conflict resolution mechanisms shows that other forms of legitimacy may be seen as more important than formal procedural democracy. can be reduced to the rational calculation of material interests and the buying and selling of loyalty between political elites is reductionist in the extreme. This misses some of the important dimensions of 'the political', particularly in divided societies like Afghanistan. Both the liberal idea that legitimacy is derived from abstract principles, or the notion that politics is purely the result of material calculation-a kind of politics without values-fails to capture the complexity and historically contingent nature of political mobilisation. Political subjectivities are shaped as much by ideas, norms and collective feelings of belonging as by individual interests. People's behaviour cannot be explained only by rational choice-they frequently act against their immediate interests and friendship, self-sacrifice, collective bonds, shame and coercion all play a role in shaping political subjectivities and behaviour in conflict. 19 These insights all help us to address a key question: do elections in war-torn societies reinforce the divisions of past violence, or can they play a role in transforming them The dynamics surrounding elections must be interpreted in light of this development. elites over access to rents, resources and positions; they are less about formal legitimacy than material resources, power and the political coalitions that emerge from such processes. In this perspective, the elections are themselves less important than the resulting division of rents, resources and positions that reflect the overarching political settlement. A third more anthropological or cultural perspective is that elections can be understood as highly choreographed exercises that target and communicate particular messages to internal and external audiences. In this sense elections are performative.
They may be less about the content or the result, than the extent to which they reassure and convince certain audiences (including western electorates as well as Afghan voters)
of the legitimacy of the exercise. The key issue from this perspective is therefore one of perceived legitimacy, and whether elections are symbolically convincing.
We briefly explore some of the analytical and policy implications of each perspective in relation to the 2014 presidential elections.
The technology of elections; democracy as 'gardening'
To a large extent this has been the dominant perspective in the policy-oriented literature. The focus has been on the strategic design of the electoral system and the conduct of elections, with the underlying aim being to create a political system that more closely resembles an open access order.
Experience from Afghanistan suggests that early strategic choices have a disproportionate effect on the trajectory of the political transition. There is a high level of path dependence, as the initial choices are difficult to reverse, and narrow the options for future reforms. This is because vested interests develop around maintaining a system that incumbents benefited from. Therefore, a highly centralised presidential system, which encouraged a winner-takes-all approach and a voting system that prevented the emergence of coherent political parties, were retained through three rounds of elections in spite of international advice and domestic mobilisation for reforms to the system. In the end an existential crisis caused by the dual threats of the insurgency and the potential for a violent contestation of power within the ruling elite, Drawing on Tilly's gardening analogy, many democracy advocates believe that the dysfunctionalities identified above can be addressed through better techniques and more systematic weeding out the 'bad apples' . However, this view fails to appreciate that there is a deeper underlying logic to elite behaviour in situations of endemic insecurity. This takes us to a political economy analysis.
The political economy of elections: forging elite bargains
Where the political settlement is out of line with economic and coercive power, violent conflict is likely in order to 'renegotiate' access to rents. Elections are likely to destabilise political coalitions, and regular elections shorten the time frames of elites and the life cycles of elite settlements. The likely result is increased volatility as elites are unwilling to credibly commit to political settlements and therefore constantly 'hedge'.
Whereas in mature democracies the whole point of elections is to inject uncertainty into the political system-to maintain open competition and to ensure that political elites are responsive to their electorates-in certain post-war contexts, they create perverse incentives for elites to only make political and economic investments in the short term.
As well as influencing the time frames of elites, elections shape mobilisation dynamics.
First, they run the risk of reinforcing identity boundaries. In contexts where political parties are weak or nascent and there are few cross-cutting horizontal ties between 28 Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence. All these tendencies were evident in the recent elections in Afghanistan. They converged in 2014 to create a crisis that was only 'solved' by disregarding the election results-which at any rate were contested and probably fraudulent-and recognizing the logic of inter-elite bargaining through a power-sharing agreement.
Where the means of violence are diffuse, the potential for competition to turn violent is Elections are therefore more than simply technical exercises or smoke screens for the pursuit of rational interests; they are rituals of participation and legitimation. And it is more complex than the idea that rituals mask the underlying reality of politics
proper. 30 The performance of elections becomes a crucial site for the production and reproduction of the political. 31 For example the internal debates within the Taliban (Giustozzi, this volume) about whether to engage with the presidential elections show that they cannot be dismissed as empty rituals-they are appropriated by local actors and in the process acquire new significance and meanings.
Khilnani writing about democracy in India notes that "democracy as a manner of seeing and acting in the world is changing the relation of Indians to themselves". 32 Whilst it would perhaps be an exaggeration to state that the democratic idea has fully penetrated the Afghan political imagination, as Khilnani argues in relation to India, it is clear that Afghans have been changed by the experience of three rounds of elections. However, the extent of this change is largely unknown, because we know so little about the 'Afghan voter'-particularly in rural areas where most of the population lives-beyond highly unreliable public opinion polls. More anthropologically oriented accounts including the contributions by Coburn and Ibrahimi in this volume show that how people vote is linked partly to patronage networks, but also to particular histories and narratives of exclusion and grievances that date back to the wartime and beyond.
At this point, what can we conclude about the role of elections in the project of democratizing Afghanistan? Going back to Tilly's metaphors described at the outset, we hold fast to the idea that the lake-rather than the oilfield or the garden -combines elements of structure and agency that are intellectually most appealing and best suited for understanding the democratizing project as a whole. As a particular instrument of this project, elections have in Afghanistan after 2001 had increasingly dysfunctional and undemocratic effects. They have not been interventions carefully tailored to fit the institutional landscape and its underlying political economy, thus reinforcing rather than transforming social divisions and attendant patronage networks. At the same time, the elections have visibly stimulated the production and reproduction of political awareness and behaviour -forces that can be harnessed in a democratic direction. The articles that follow address a range of questions raised by the 2014 election. We cast the net wide to catch a variety of substantive issues as well as analytical perspectives. Smith opens his analysis by laying out the case for rigorously upholding standards, but then moves towards a more cautious position. "This is not an argument to jettison democracy promotion, but to look more closely at elections and democracy as a means by which broken societies can truly govern themselves, not simply govern themselves in the precise way we would wish them to govern themselves." As to any healing or stabilising function that elections might have on society, Smith refers to a conversation with two of his Afghan friends. As they reflect on the role of electoral democracy in contemporary Afghanistan, one compares it to "Dracula, continually rising from the dead but sucking the blood out of the country," the other finds it "more like Frankenstein, a monster created in a lab that had gotten destructively out of control."
Scott Smith
These are not, metaphors of consolidation, Smith concludes.
William Byrd examines the tension between democratic elections and inter-elite In Afghanistan, Byrd argues, access to political power and economic rents is determined through bargaining among mostly armed elites. When bargains are reached, relative peace prevails, but the threat of violence is ever-present because bargaining is not regulated by formal legal structures, there is no official agent to mediate the outcome, and the participants can reasonably fear that the loser will not get a fair go a second time around. In North's nomenclature, Afghanistan is a "fragile limited access order".
Introducing elections in such a situation creates a profound mismatch between the structures of power in society and the formal process of allocating power. This time, the US prevented probable outbreaks of violence by forging a settlement based on bargaining that set aside the electoral results, which were not even publicly announced.
The process discredited elections and thereby political democracy as a mode of governance, Byrd concludes. As analysts in the earlier literature on elections in divided societies, he calls for long-term institutional development to rectify the situation.
Development of programmatic political parties is particularly important. Parties can widen the access to power and, through participation in regular elections, lower the stakes and temperature in particular elections insofar as the loser at one time will have a fair chance the next time around. Byrd makes a sharp distinction between "the people"
and "the elites", similar to the analysis by Susanne Schmeidl in another article in this issue. To conclude that the Afghan people are not ready for democracy is erroneous.
"Such a conclusion would do gross disservice to the millions of Afghans who voted in good faith" and others who worked to make the election possible. Ghani's broad historical narrative reinforced ethno-cultural collective memories of discrimination and subjugation among the Hazara; these memories also seemed to confirm and make sense of recent repeated cases of violent conflict between Pashtun
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